

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARRYL TELLIS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:22-cv-858

v.

Honorable Robert J. Jonker

M. BRAMAN et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (ECF No. 11.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint for failure to state a claim.¹ The Court will also deny as moot Plaintiff's motion

¹ Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on October 28, 2022, along with his documentation supporting his request to proceed *in forma pauperis* in this matter. A party may amend once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)*. Plaintiff, therefore, was entitled to file his amended complaint without leave of Court, and the amended complaint is the operative pleading in this matter.

for an extension of time (ECF No. 6) to submit financial documentation in support of his request to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

Discussion

I. Pending Motion

As noted *supra*, Plaintiff has filed a motion requesting an extension of time to submit the necessary financial documentation to support his request to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (ECF No. 6.) After filing this motion, Plaintiff submitted the required documentation on October 28, 2022 (ECF No. 10), and he has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time will, therefore, be denied as moot.

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF) in Muskegon, Muskegon County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following MTU personnel: Warden M. Braman, Assistant Deputy Warden Aneka Stewart, Grievance Coordinator N. Lake, Prison Counselor Unknown Cuellar, and "Mail Lady" Unknown Kzcalovic. Plaintiff also names four Unknown Parties who are employed in the MTU mail room, and four Unknown Parties that are employed in the MTU business office.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on July 18, 2022, Defendants Kzcalovic and the Unknown Parties employed in the mail room and business office did not process his expedited legal mail forms and return them to him. (ECF No. 9, PageID.38–39) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Cueller assisted with the "corruption" by trying to cover up any tampering with his legal mail forms and legal mail. (*Id.*, PageID.39.)

On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff talked to Defendant Cueller about the forms not being processed, and Defendant Cueller told Plaintiff that Defendant Kzcalovic “said that it [was not] legal mail and that she sent it out as ID mail instead.” (*Id.*) That same day, Defendant Lake failed to process Plaintiff’s grievance about the issue. (*Id.*) A few days later, Plaintiff submitted a grievance about Defendant Lake’s failure to process the grievance regarding the legal mail issue. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also faults Defendants Braman and Stewart for failing to ensure compliance with MDOC policy and for refusing to correct the problem and ignoring his complaint. (*Id.*)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff asserts First Amendment access to the courts claims. He also appears to assert claims regarding interference with his outgoing legal mail, claims raising violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, as well as claims concerning the administration of the grievance procedure at MTU. Plaintiff also suggests that Defendants violated various MDOC Policy Directives, and that Defendants Braman and Stewart were negligent under state law by not ensuring compliance with such policies. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, as well as compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. (*Id.*, PageID.46–47.)

III. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Id.*; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a ““probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Id.* at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

A. Claims Against Defendants Braman, Stewart, and Lake

Plaintiff vaguely suggests that Defendants Braman and Stewart violated his constitutional rights by failing to ensure compliance with MDOC policies and by ignoring his complaints about his legal mail forms. (ECF No. 9, PageID.39.) He also avers that they “failed to train [their] staff on how to follow the rules and policies of the department and fulfill their duties assigned to them.” (*Id.*, PageID.45.) Further, he asserts that Defendant Lake denied his grievance concerning the issues with his mail. (*Id.*, PageID.43.) The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s claims regarding the grievance process and then addresses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Braman, Stewart, and Lake in their supervisory positions.

1. Claims Regarding Grievance Process

Plaintiff appears to suggest that Defendant Lake violated his due process rights by not acting upon his grievance. Plaintiff, however, has no due process right to file a prison grievance. The courts repeatedly have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. *See Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); *Walker v. Mich. Dep't of Corr.*, 128 F. App'x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); *Argue v. Hofmeyer*, 80 F. App'x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); *Young v. Gundy*, 30 F. App'x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); *Carpenter v. Wilkinson*, No. 99-3562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); *see also Antonelli v. Sheahan*, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); *Adams v. Rice*, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. *See Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); *Keenan v. Marker*, 23 F. App'x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); *Wynn v. Wolf*, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, Defendant Lake's conduct did not deprive him of due process.

Moreover, Plaintiff's right to petition government was not violated by Defendant Lake's failure to act on his grievance. The First Amendment "right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen's views." *Apple v. Glenn*, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); *see also Minn. State Bd. for Cnty. Colls. v. Knight*, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond).

Finally, Defendant Lake's actions have not barred Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his grievances. *See Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). "A prisoner's constitutional right to assert grievances typically is not violated when prison officials prohibit only 'one of several ways in which inmates may voice their complaints to, and seek relief, from prison officials' while leaving

a formal grievance procedure intact.” *Griffin v. Berghuis*, 563 F. App’x 411, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing *Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.*, 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977)). Indeed, Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress is underscored by his *pro se* invocation of the judicial process. *See Azeez v. DeRobertis*, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing a grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to file institutional grievances, and he therefore cannot demonstrate the actual injury required for an access-to-the-courts claim. *See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (requiring actual injury); *Bounds v. Smith*, 430 U.S. 817, 821–24 (1977). The exhaustion requirement only mandates exhaustion of *available* administrative remedies. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If Plaintiff were improperly denied access to the grievance process, the process would be rendered unavailable, and exhaustion would not be a prerequisite for initiation of a civil rights action. *See Ross v. Blake*, 578 U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by the interference of officials, the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is not required); *Kennedy v. Tallio*, 20 F. App’x 469, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2001). In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendant Lake regarding the failure to act upon Plaintiff’s grievance.

2. Supervisory Liability

It appears that Plaintiff has named Braman, Stewart, and Lake as Defendants because of their respective supervisory positions. Government officials, however, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676; *Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); *Everson v. Leis*, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. *Grinter v. Knight*, 532 F.3d 567,

575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); *Greene v. Barber*, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. *Grinter*, 532 F.3d at 576; *Greene*, 310 F.3d at 899; *Summers v. Leis*, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. *See Shehee v. Luttrell*, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676.

The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official:

“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable *unless* the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” *Shehee*, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”

Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Shehee*, 199 F.3d at 300, and citing *Phillips v. Roane Cnty.*, 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); *see also Copeland v. Machulis*, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976), and *Bellamy v. Bradley*, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); *Walton v. City of Southfield*, 995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993); *Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff*, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts from which the Court could infer that Defendants Braman and Stewart encouraged or condoned the conduct of their subordinates, or authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct. Indeed, he fails to allege any facts at all about their conduct. Moreover, with respect to Defendant Lake, Plaintiff merely alleges that Lake denied his grievance, which is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983. *See Shehee*, 199 F.3d at 300.

His vague and conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility are insufficient to demonstrate that Defendants Braman, Stewart, and Lake were personally involved in the events alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. *See Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678–79; *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. Because Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants are premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability, he fails to state a claim against them. The Court, therefore, will dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Braman, Stewart, and Lake.

B. First Amendment Access to the Courts Claims

Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to access the courts by not ensuring that his expedited legal mail forms were processed. It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. *Bounds v. Smith*, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The principal issue in *Bounds* was whether the states must protect the right of access to the courts by providing law libraries or alternative sources of legal information for prisoners. *Id.* at 817. The Court further noted that in addition to law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge, the states must provide indigent inmates with “paper and pen to draft legal documents, notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” *Id.* at 824–25. The right of access to the courts also prohibits prison officials from erecting barriers that may impede the inmate's access to the courts. *See Knop v. Johnson*, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992).

An indigent prisoner's constitutional right to legal resources and materials is not, however, without limit. In order to state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show “actual injury.” *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); *see also Talley-Bey v. Knebl*, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); *Knop*, 977 F.2d at 1000. In other words, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the shortcomings in the prison legal assistance program or lack of legal materials have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous

legal claim. *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 351–53; *see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield*, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there may be an actual injury:

Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. “Thus, a prisoner’s right to access the courts extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only.” *Thaddeus-X v. Blatter*, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Moreover, the underlying action must have asserted a non-frivolous claim. *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 353; *accord Hadix v. Johnson*, 182 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (*Lewis* changed actual injury to include requirement that action be non-frivolous).

In addition, the Supreme Court squarely has held that “the underlying cause of action . . . is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” *Christopher v. Harbury*, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). “Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” *Id.* at 415.

Plaintiff’s sole allegation is that he was denied access to the courts because his expedited legal mail forms were not processed. Plaintiff’s complaint is utterly devoid of facts suggesting that he suffered an actual injury to any litigation. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. *See Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678–79; *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment access to the courts claims will be dismissed.

C. Claims Related to Outgoing Legal Mail

Plaintiff contends that his right to use the mail was violated because Defendants failed to process his expedited legal mail forms. In *Sallier v. Brooks*, 343 F.3d 868, 873–74 (6th Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered multiple potential sources of protection for legal mail, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances, the First Amendment right of access to the courts, and the prisoner’s general interest in protecting the attorney-client privilege. Simply calling a particular correspondence “legal mail,” however, does not implicate each and every one of those protections. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only to criminal prosecutions. *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 576–77 (1974) (“As to the Sixth Amendment, its reach is only to protect the attorney-client relations in the criminal setting. . . .”); *see also Stanley v. Vining*, 602 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 2010). There are no facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint that support the inference that Plaintiff was attempting to send legal mail to an attorney related to a criminal proceeding. Likewise, as discussed *supra*, there are no facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint that support the inference that the communication bore any relationship to Plaintiff’s direct appeal of his criminal convictions, a habeas corpus application, or a civil rights claim. *See Thaddeus-X*, 175 F.3d at 391 (noting that the First Amendment right to access the courts “extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only”).

The ability of a prisoner “to receive materials of a legal nature” related to his legal rights and concerns itself implicates a fundamental right. *Kensu v. Haigh*, 87 F.3d 172, 174 (6th Cir. 1996). Courts have, therefore, extended protections to prisoners’ legal mail that do not exist for general mail. However, not all outgoing mail constitutes “legal mail,” and “the question of what constitutes ‘legal mail’ is a question of law.” *Sallier*, 343 F.3d at 871. The Michigan Administrative Code defines “legal mail” as correspondence with courts, attorneys, public

officials, the office of the legislative corrections ombudsman, MDOC’s central office staff, and staff of the institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated. *See Mich. Admin. Code R. 791.6603(7)* (Nov. 15, 2008). Moreover, “the determination of whether mail is considered legal mail depends not only on the nature of the sender, but on the appearance of the mail [as well as] the nature of the contents.” *Longmire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.*, 454 F. Supp. 3d 702, 708 (W.D. Mich. 2020) *aff’d* No. 20-1389, 2021 WL 5352809, at *2 (6th Cir. Jun. 9, 2021) (“[T]he mail must be ‘properly and clearly marked as legal materials.’ . . . [W]hile the envelope states that it is confidential, it was not, as the district court held, ‘clearly marked as legal mail,’ nor did it have the Commission’s name on it or other salient information, such as ‘the name and bar number of a licensed attorney.’”).

Plaintiff’s allegations fall far short in both respects. Simply referencing “legal mail” is insufficient to invoke these protections. Plaintiff’s complaint is wholly devoid of facts from which the Court could infer that his outgoing legal mail was tampered with. Plaintiff does not describe the nature of the legal mail he was intending to send, nor does he state to whom or what he was sending the mail. In any event, with respect to outgoing mail, “isolated instances of interference with prisoners’ mail,” such as that alleged by Plaintiff, may not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the First Amendment. *See Johnson v. Wilkinson*, No. 98-3866, 2000 WL 1175519, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (citing *Gardner v. Howard*, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997)); *Colvin v. Caruso*, 605 F.3d 282, 293 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing *Johnson* for the holding that “isolated incidents” of interference with prisoners’ rights do not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims premised upon interference with legal mail will be dismissed.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff vaguely states that Defendants violated his due process rights by not ensuring that his expedited legal mail forms were processed. (ECF No. 9, PageID.40.) To the extent that Plaintiff

intended to raise a substantive due process claim regarding Defendants' conduct, he fails to state such a claim. "Substantive due process 'prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" *Prater v. City of Burnside*, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). "Substantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used." *Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs.*, 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Howard v. Grinage*, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). "Conduct shocks the conscience if it 'violates the decencies of civilized conduct.'" *Range v. Douglas*, 763 F.3d 573, 589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)).

"Where a particular [a]mendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that [a]mendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'" *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 273–75 (1994) (quoting *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process, provides the standard for analyzing claims involving unreasonable search or seizure of free citizens). If such an amendment exists, the substantive due process claim is properly dismissed. *See Heike v. Guevara*, 519 F. App'x 911, 923 (6th Cir. 2013). In this case, Plaintiff's claims regarding interference with outgoing mail and his access to the courts are properly analyzed under the First Amendment. *See supra* Part III.C. Consequently, any intended substantive due process claim will be dismissed.

Plaintiff also avers that Defendants' conduct violated numerous MDOC Policy Directives in violation of his due process rights. Section 1983, however, does not provide redress for violations of state law. *See Pyles v. Raisor*, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); *Sweeton v. Brown*,

27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). The only possible way a policy might enjoy constitutional protection would be through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

To demonstrate a due process violation, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a life, liberty, or property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause; and (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without adequate process. *Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Baird*, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006). "Without a protected liberty or property interest, there can be no federal procedural due process claim." *Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris*, 503 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing *Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972)). Courts, however, have routinely recognized that a prisoner does not enjoy any federal protected liberty or property interest in state procedure. *See Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983); *Laney v. Farley*, 501 F.3d 577, 581 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007); *Brody v. City of Mason*, 250 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2001); *Sweeton*, 27 F.3d at 1164. Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants violated MDOC policy and procedure, therefore, fail to raise cognizable federal constitutional claims.

E. State Law Negligence Claims

Plaintiff appears to suggest that Defendants Braman and Stewart were negligent under state law by not ensuring compliance with MDOC policy. Ordinarily, where a district court has exercised jurisdiction over a state law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state law claims. *See Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris* 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff's federal law claim, it should not reach state law claims.") (citing *United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs*, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)); *Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc.*, 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction, "[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding

state law issues.” *Landefeld*, 994 F.2d at 1182; *see also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply*, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.”) (internal quotations omitted). Dismissal, however, remains “purely discretionary.” *Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1337(c)); *Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC*, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims without prejudice.

Conclusion

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s federal claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s state law negligence claims without prejudice because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. The Court will also deny as moot Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to submit financial documents to support his request for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (ECF No. 6.)

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. *Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610–11,

unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

An order and judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: November 4, 2022

/s/ Robert J. Jonker

Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge